Entries for 'Sanctions'

This paper highlights why sanctions on Russia should not be considered static. Rather, they are a "moving target" requiring regular adjustments as their consequences play out and countermeasures are taken. Importantly, we have also yet to reach the top rung of the escalation ladder. Western allies could take additional steps in the coming weeks and months to keep up pressure on the Russian government.

An EU embargo on Russian crude oil exports would have a meaningful impact. Oil accounts for one-fourth of Russian exports and around 30% of fiscal revenues. Ultimately, the effect will depend on the country’s capacity to redirect exports. Infrastructure constraints and the threat of secondary sanctions are key challenges. European decision-makers may prefer direct sanctions on the shipping industry. Overall, the EU has a better chance of limiting "seaborne" (vs. pipeline) oil exports.

Severe sanctions have focused on Russia’s domestic financial system, with freezes of Bank of Russia assets among the most impactful steps. Emergency liquidity support by the CBR stabilized the banking system. The Ruble has also made up most of its losses due to capital controls, together with large current account surpluses and tight monetary policy. We see a tightening of financial sector sanctions as likely going forward.

Sanctions have hit the Russian economy hard, but more measures are likely coming. At this time, the discussion largely focuses on a potential embargo on energy exports. We show that a stop to natural gas imports would be much more difficult than to oil. This is due to both Europe’s gas supply composition as well as the mode of delivery. For Russia, an embargo would have a dramatic effect on overall activity and exports. The country could lose $250-300 bn in export receipts, depending on price dynamics.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a number of severe sanctions. China, an important partner, has maintained a deliberately neutral stance. While Russia-China trade is important, financial links remain minimal. China could mitigate Russia’s loss of access to global payment systems. Furthermore, with 40% of reserves frozen, holdings in China are critical. The Bank of Russia (CBR) may need to get creative with FX interventions.

This paper will systematically look at additional sanctions that have been or could be imposed on Russia in several key areas: global payments systems, access to the U.S. Dollar, sovereign debt, hydrocarbon exports, and export controls. Equally important, it will not only analyze the effects of these latest sanctions on the Russian economy but also the broader implications for international financial markets. For example, one of the biggest impacts on the global economy is likely to be on trade. While details on how the new sanctions affect energy are still emerging, we do know that sanctions on its central bank will make it more difficult for Russia to export energy and other commodities. As a result, we may see commodity prices surge.

Natural gas imports from Russia have fallen sharply, and storage levels are extremely low. Europe’s high dependence on the country creates vulnerabilities and limits policy options. In the short term, Europe would likely be able to manage even in case of a full disruption. But a full replacement of Russian imports does not seem feasible for a number of reasons. Among them are infrastructure constraints and the lack of alternative supplier capacities. Thus, politically and/or economically painful demand-side adjustments would be needed. Nonetheless, Europe should begin to invest in reducing vulnerabilities while there is time.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is expected to enter into service in 2022H2. Several rounds of U.S. sanctions have delayed but not stopped the project. And the administration is attempting to mend fences with European allies. But additional measures are likely in case of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. For Europe, sanctions related to natural gas imports are highly problematic. However, a Russian escalation of the Ukraine conflict would force hands. German authorities are considering "all possible measures" against NS2.

The European Union and the U.S. recently introduced new sanctions on Belarus. We look at precedents for sovereign debt sanctions to assess the potential impact. Primary market restrictions did not have a strong effect when imposed on Russia. But the Venezuela case shows secondary market restrictions to be consequential. For Belarus, Russian support should help limit external financing stress for now.

Could a Chinese CBDC displace the dollar as the global reserve currency, undermine the U.S. sanctions regime or provide the Chinese government with the ability to increase surveillance on citizens?

Investors are concerned about the possibility of additional sanctions on Russia. German officials have threatened action against Nord Stream 2 in recent weeks. This would have important geopolitical, but likely limited economic, implications. Additional sanctions by the U.S. could depend on the 2020 presidential election. However, the Russian economy is substantially less vulnerable compared to 2014.

Economic sanctions are a form of government market intervention and can have significant unintended and uncertain consequences—particularly if they are placed on an economy highly integrated into the global economy and the international financial system. In this respect, the measures taken by the United States and its allies against Russia beginning in 2014 represented a paradigm shift.

Sanctions on a highly-integrated economy such as Russia are still unprecedented. Unforeseen and unintended consequences could significantly shake up markets. The impact is likely most significant for asset managers and banking institutions. But further consequences for the underlying market infrastructure are possible.

The debate on U.S. sanctions on sovereign debt is expected to continue in '20. Low macroeconomic vulnerabilities will likely limit the impact on Russia. U.S. investors would lose out given investments in Russian domestic debt. Unintended consequences could also significantly shake up global markets.

The US and EU have introduced numerous financial sanctions on Russia. The first episode of multilateral sanctions in 2014 had the biggest impact. Limiting investor access to the Ruble market (OFZ) is unlikely to be as severe. Existing sanctions will weigh on investment, productivity, and growth.

Sharp improvement in risk appetite reflects improved valuations as well as more supportive Fed policy; As new U.S. sanctions take hold, holders of Venezuelan bonds contemplate next steps; Wobbles in the leveraged loan market; millennials give a boost to U.S. commercial real estate; ESG index performance—doing good doesn’t mean giving up returns, especially in emerging markets!